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INSANITY AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY.
(REPORT

OF COMMITTEE B OF THE INSTITUTE.')

EDWIN R. KEEDY,

Chairman.

Introduction .- Great dissatisfaction regarding the trial of the issue
of insanity in criminal cases and the results thereof is being expressed
on all sides. The layman claims that sane men are escaping responsibility for their crimes on the plea of insanity by reason of the venality
of experts, the strong and corrupt partisanship of counsel for the refense, and the incompetency of the judge and the prosecuting attorney.
The medical profession claims that the inadequate and artificial tests of
the law, the restricted and inefficient methods of taking testimony, the
ignorance on the part of judge and counsel of the medical aspect of
insanity, prevent a proper determination of the question of responsibility. The legal profession replies by saying that the medical experts
are paid to testify on one side, that they cannot agree amongst themselves and that they have no appreciation of the fact that criminal
responsibility is a legal and not a medical question.
Before remedies for this situation can properly be proposed, it is
necessary to consider how such a situation arose. First, it must be
noticed that the present views and theories regarding insanity, even
among members of the medical profession, are very modern. Till a
'A preliminary report presented at the Third Annual Meeting of the Institute, at Boston, September I, 1911. The resolution allotting the scope of the
Committee's work, and its members for igio-Ii, are as follows:
"An investigation of the insane offender, with a view, first, to ascertain
how the existing legal rules of criminal responsibility can be adjusted to the
conclusions of modern medical science and modern penal science, and, secondly,
to devise such amendments in the mode of legal proceedings as will best realize
these principles and avoid current abuses."
Comilr=E: Edwin R. Keedy, Chicago, (professor of law in Northwestern
University), Chairman.
Adolf Meyer, Baltimore (professor of psychiatry in Johns Hopkins University).
Harold N. Moyer, Chicago (physician).
W. A. White, Washington (superintendent Government Hospital for the Insane).
William E. Mikell, Philadelphia (professor of law in University
of Pennsylvania).
Albert H. Barnes, Chicago (former judge of the Superior Court).
Walter Wheeler Cook (professor of law in University of Chicago).
Archibald Church, Chicago (professor of nervous and mental
diseases and medical jurisprudence in Northwestern University).
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century ago insanity was generally regarded as of supernatural origin,
Even the most learned physicians, says
either divine or diabolic.'
Dr. 21audsley,2 put the devil but one step further back. The accepted
method of medical treatment consisted of manacles and the lash; and the
law had nothing but its harshest punishments for those who were considered perversely and diabolically wicked. It was not till the early
part of the nineteenth century that there arose an appreciation of the
fact that the abnormalities of the insane were due to disease. At this
time the medical profession recognized two kinds of insanity-partial
and total. This classification was based upon the then prevailing psychological theory that the functions of the brain were divided into distinct
parts, each of which had a considerable independence of the others. According to this view, any function might be impaired without causing a
disturbance of the others.3 Consequently, it was believed that a man
might be insane on one or more subjects and perfectly sane as to others;
for instance, that he night suffer from an insane delusion and be in
all other respects sane. In the case of total insanity, it was thought
that the victim was completely deprived of the power of understanding.
These views of the physicians were presented in their testimony
before the jury in criminal trials, and the judge, following the customary practice, commented on this evidence in summing up the case to the
jury. The answers of the judge in M'1Saghten's case in 1843 were
simply a summary of the summings up of the trial judges in preceding
cases. The "right and wrong test" and the "delusion test" laid. down
by the judges in M['Naghten's case were but a statement of the prevalent
medical and psychological theories of insanity. These tests, with modifications in some jurisdictions, have been applied to the present day.
In the meantime, however, the views of the medical profession have
been continually changing, and the old theories have been discarded.
The result is that today the legal test of insanity is in sharp conflict
with the views of the medical profession.4 This fact causes much of the
dissatisfaction between members of the two professions.
'This supernatural view of insanity was suggested in a judicial opinion in
this country as late as 1862. In State v. Brandon, 8 Jones (N. C.), 463, the
Supreme Court of North Carolina said: "The law does not recognize any moral
power compelling one to do what he knows is wrong. 'Toknow the right and
still the wrong pursue' proceeds from a perverse will brought about by the
seductions of the evil one. * * * If the prisoner knew that what he did was
wrong, the law presumes that he had the power to resist it, against all supernatural agencies, and holds him amenable to punishment."
'Responsibility in Mental Disease, 9.
*Paton, Psychiatry, Iig.
4See article by Dr. Morton Prince, in Jour. Amer. Med. Assn., vol. 49, p.
1463, 1465.
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The inherent difficulties of the problem of determining the proper
relation between insanity and criminal responsibility, coupled with the
fact that some physicians are venal and some lawyers are corrupt, will
explain many of the grounds of dissatisfaction stated at the beginning.
Definitions of Criminal Responsibility and Inanity.-It is necessary to consider at this point what criminal responsibility is and how
this is affected by insanity. Criminal responsibility means accountability for one's actions to the criminal law. The tests of criminal responsibility are the rules of law which determine the guilt (upon which
the punishment is based) of those who cause certain injuries, carefully
defined by the law, to individuals or society in general. Criminal
responsibility is then a purely legal question to be determined by the
tests and machinery of the law.
As criminal responsibility is a purely legal question, so insanity
is a medical one which must be answered by the physician. He should
decide whether an individual is suffering from a mental disorder and
if so determine its character and its symptoms, just as he is the only
one who can properly diagnose a case of physical ill-health. This being
so, the physician's idea of insanity should be accepted, and according
to him the term "insanity" is vague and misleading. The popular idea
is that insanity is a definite, clearly defined state with a sharp line of
cleavage separating it from a state of sanity. To the physician, insanity
means nothing but mental derangement, as general a term as physical
unsoundness. Just as there is a gradual, almost imperceptible shading
between physical health and sickness, so there is between mental health
and mental derangement. The physician differentiates between many
kinds of mental diseases, each with its more or less characteristic symptoms.
The problem is to connect the physician's diagnosis of the mental
condition of a particular individual with the legal tests of criminal responsibility.
Relation of Insanity to Criminal Respansibility.-According to the
English common law, a crime consists of a criminal act done with a
criminal intent. This criminal intent is defined by the law and varies
with the particular crime. In other words, a particular state of mind
must accompany and give rise to a particular act in order to constitute
a particular crime. It is true that there has developed a class of misdemeanors largely statutory, which require no criminal intent. These
misdemeanors may be grouped as public torts and prohibitions under
the police power and do not present any difficulty in the present prob-
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lem, as no case has been found where insanity has been set up as a
defense to such a misdemeanor and'no such case is likely to arise. There
are also a few decisions to the effect that there may be a conviction for
bigamy in the absence of any criminal intent, but these decisions have
been criticized and there are cases contra. For all purposes, so far. as
the question of insanity is concerned, it may be taken as a hypothesis
that every crime requires a criminal intent and that any fact which
negatives the necessary intent in a good defense. It follows that when
the defendant's mental derangement is set up as a defense to a charge
of crime the question is not whether the defendant is insane, but whether,
by reason of the particular mental disease from which he was suffering,
he lacked the intent 'necessary to the crime with which he is charged.
It is not the fact of insanity, but the symptoms thereof that are important in determining the question of criminal responsibility. The
problem is no different, when insanity is set up as a defense, from what
it is when it is claimed that some other fact negatives. the criminal intent.
The question is the same when the defense is physical ill-health. It
means nothing to say that a man who killed another was physically sick
at the tine. Nor does it help to say that he had typhoid fever. But,
if it can be shown that he was delirious by reason of the fever and that
the act committed was produced by this delirium, then there is a good
defense.
Method of Trial.-The next question is: How shall the issue of
criminal responsibility, when insanity is a defense, be tried, and what
are the proper functions of the judge, the medical expert and the jury?
Some help in answering this question may be gained by referring to
the ordinary method of trial when the defendant relies upon some defense other than insanity. Take, for instance, a case where the defendant claims he acted under a mistake of fact. Here, after the evidence showing the commission of the criminal act, the defendant introduces evidence to show the mistake and its character.. The judge then
tells the jury what state of mind must accompany the act in order to
constitute the crime charged. Finally the jury determines whether the
mistake of the defendant negatives the existence of this necessary state
of mind.
In the case already referred to, where the defendant claimed he'
was suffering from the delirium of typhoid fever at the time of the'
commission of the alleged criminal act, the procedure would be the
same. The medical witnesses for the defendant would testify as to
whether or not the defendant was delirious, would explain to the jury'
the nature of such .delirium' and express their opinion regarding the
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effect which such delirium would have upon the defendant's understanding, judgment and volition. The jury as before, under instructions from the judge, would determine the question of responsibility.
In the case of insanity, the procedure should be the same. The
medical expert, if he has examined the defendant, should state the results of his examination and describe the symptoms of the disease; and
should then state his opinion regarding the effect of such symptoms
upon the powers of understanding and volition. If the expert has
-made no examination, his testimony must be confined to a statement
of opinion based upon the testimony of other witnesses. The judge
should explain to the jury what state of mind the law requires in th6
particular case, giving concrete examples, and describing situations of
fact, some of which indicate the presence, others, the absence of such
state of mind.' The jury should then determine whether the expert's
description of the defendant's state of mind coincides with that defined
and illustrated by the judge.
Dxpert Testimony.-In attempting to determine a proper method
of trying the question of criminal responsibility when insanity is set
up as a defense, it is advisable at the outset to consider a certain phase
of expert testimony. The law is dependent upon the physician to diagnose the condition of the defendant, to state the symptoms, and to
express his opinion regarding the manner in which the defendant would
react to certain extraneous stimuli. The existing methods of presenting
expert testimony and the character thereof are much criticized. It is
submitted that some, at least, of this criticism, is without foundation.
Experts in a case are often condemned because they disagree. Such
condemnation is based upon the false assumption that all mental diseases
are capable of a clear-cut and unmistakable diagnosis and that the
symptoms of particular mental diseases never vary. The very nature of
the subject, illusory and intangible as it is, makes uniformity of opinion
in all cases impossible. Another reason why there is often disagreement among experts has been set forth by a member of this committee:
"The reason why experts can be found for either side of a given case
is because practically every case that goes into court has two sides,
and experts, like other people, are of many minds, and it is naturally
no more difficult to get experts who will testify on a given side than it
is to get lay witnesses to do so, and yet we never hear a wholesale
denunciation of the lay witnesses because they are not all on one side
'The restoration of the common law power of the trial judge to charge the
jury on expert evidence was advocated by William Schofield and E. R. Thayer
in Boston Med. and Surg., Vol. i61, pp. 957 and 967, respectively.
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of a case. Each side hunts for an expert who will agree with their
theory of the case and they hunt until they find one. It never appears
in evidence how many experts may have refused to testify before the
desired one is finally discovered." 6 '
The unsatisfactory character of much expert testimony as to insanity is believed to be due to the following causes: (1) the fact that
some medical experts are incompetent and venal; (2) that some trial
lawyers are corruptly partisan, and that others have an insufficient
knowledge of the subject and their examination of an expert witness
is dependent upon questions furnished by the witness; 7 (3) that there
is often a failure on the part of judge, counsel and expert to understand
and appreciate the relation which insanity bears to criminal responsibility. The hypothetical question as a method of examination would
be added by many to this list.8 Your committee has nothing to report
on this matter at present, but plans to consider this during the coming
year.
It will be seen that much of the difficulty involved in the matter
of expert testimony is due to the faults and incompetency of individual
members of the legal and medical professions. The responsibility for
this rests upon the two professions and this committee strongly urges
upon them the necessity of establishing and maintaining higher ethical
and professional standards.
An arbitrary method of preventing incompetent and unprincipled
physicians from testifying as experts is suggested. Statutory enactment
may provide that witnesses who give opinion evidence must be chose* from
a definite qualifled group. Such a statute, it is believed, would be
constitutional. 9 The constitutional provision giving one accused of
'Expert Testimony and the Alienist, by Dr. Win. A. White, N. Y. Med. Jour.,
July 25, 1908.

'In a paper read before the Conference on the Reform of the Criminal Law
and Procedure at Columbia University on May I3,1911, Dr. Carlos F. MacDonald
presented, inter alia, the following resolution: "That it is the sense of the conference that it is subversive of the dignity of the medical profession for any of
its members to occupy the position of medical advisory counsel in open court
and at the same time to act as expert witness in a medico-legal case."
'The American Neurological Association at its annual meeting on May 13,
x9II, adopted, inter alia, the following resolution: "That we consider the hypothetical question as ordinarily presented to be unscientific, misleading and dangerous."
"'The law of evidence is under the control of the legislature and the courts,
though in criminal cases the Constitution gives the defendant the right to be confronted by the witnesses against him. Our code and statutes now restrict the
rights of a litigant as to the production of his proof. They fix the qualifications
and compensation and, in some cases, the number of ordinary witnesses and the
form of direct examination and cross-examination. The legislature has even a
clearer right to'regulate the selection and compensation of experts who are to
give their opinions or conclusions, though many lawyers believe that the consti-
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crime the right "to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses
in his favor" does not cover the qualifications of witnesses nor their
number. It merely provides that qualified witnesses may be compelled
to attend. Under the present practice, before a witness can give opinion
evidence he must convince the trial judge of his qualifications. The
trial court in its discretion may limit the number of expert witnesses
and statutes have been passed fixing the number of such witnesses.
Though in theory a trial judge might exclude witnesses to facts when
their evidence is merely cumulative, yet this has never been done, and
it is doubtful whether a statute providing for such limitation would be
upheld. However, since it has been recognized for many years that
the judge may limit the number of expert witnesses, a statute such as
is suggested would not be open to attack under the "due process of law"
clause of the constitution. In a recent case10 the Supreme Court of
Michigan held unconstitutional as violating the "due process of law
clause," a statute providing that in homicide cases where the issues involve
expert knowledge, the court shall appoint suitable disinterested persons to
investigate the issues and testify at the trial, and the fact that such witnesses have been appointed shall be made known to the jury, but either
the prosecution or defendant may use their- expert witnesses at the
trial. The court reached its conclusion on the ground that "the reasons
which impel the court to make the selection are not of record and can
never be known;" the names of the witnesses would not be known to
the prisoner in advance; and the official sanction of the court given to
the testimony of certain witnesses would tend to nullify the effect of the
testimony of other witnesses. Even conceding that this decision is
correct, its doctrine would not include the statute here proposed.
The result of the suggested statute would be that any physician who
had examined the defendant could give in evidence what he discovered
in such examination, and his opinion based thereon, but would not be
permitted to express any opinion based upon the testimony of other
witnesses, nor to answer any hypothetical questions unless he belonged
to the qualified group of experts.
It is recognized that the proposed statute requiring the selection
of expert medical witnesses from a qualified group involves the questions
as to what shall be the necessary qualifications and who shall determine
them. It might be urged that the appointment of official experts to
tution has not allowed the legislature to take from a party the right to choose
his own experts." Edward J. McDermott in Jour. of Crim. Law and Criminol.,
vol. I, p. 698, 7oo.

'People v. Dickerson, 129 N. W. R. ig9 (igio).
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be paid by the state would be subject to political influences, and thus
the very end desired would be defeated. It would seem that some responsibility might be placed upon 'the various medical associations to
recommend a group from which the appointments might be made. At
least the statute could provide that no one could qualify as an expert
unless he had a specific training and experience. Your committee at
present has no recommendation to make regarding the manner of selecting the qualified experts. It, however, hopes to be able to suggest
a plan at the next meeting. The general plan is believed to be worthy
of approval.
A further restriction upon the right of medical experts to testify
is believed to be desirable. Under the present practice a physician
who has examined the defendant my state the results of such examination and may express an opinion based upon what he discovered by the
examination. In addition to this he is allowed to answer hypothetical
questions based upon the evidence of other witnesses. This leads to confusion because of the difficulty of distinguishing, throughout the examination, between the "real man" and the "hypothetical man." There
is also the temptation on the part of the witness to make his second
opinion agree with the first. A medical witness who has stated an opinion, based upon his examination of the defendant, should not be asked
to give an opinion dependent upon the testimony of other witnesses.
There should be a distinct line of cleavage between medical witnesses,
who testify as to facts and state opinions based on them, and those who
pass upon hypothetical statements of testimony. The present practice
by which attorneys may ask hypothetical questions before the evidence
upon which they are based is introduced, under the promise that they
will later produce witnesses to testify along these lines, is thoroughly
unsatisfactory, if not actually vicious.
Function of Jury.-It has often been urged that the jury is not
qualified to pass upon the question of the defendants sanity, and that
the function of the jury should be limited to finding that the act was
committed, and that a commission of experts should then determine the
question of the defendant's responsibility.'
The first objection to this proposal is that it assumes that the
present function of the jury is to decide simply whether the defendant
is sane or insane. This, as explained above, is not the question for the
jury, the proper question for them being whether the mental element
required by law was present. This the jury has to decide in every criminal case.
The second objection to the proposal is as to its constitutionality.
-
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The constitution 'uarantees the right of trial by jury. This guarantee
means more than that twelve men shall sit together in the court room
during a defendant's trial. It means that the defendant has a right to
have the necessary elements of his guilt passed upon by the jury. According to the law, criminal intent is a necessary requisite of crime.
Consequently the jury which decides whether the criminal act was
committed must determine whether the criminal intent was present or
absent. The proposal under discussion would also be invalid under the
due-process-of-law clause of the constitution. In Oborn v. State,1 the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that the defendant has a constitutional right to have all the issues in his case, including any special issue
of fact, particularly as to his sanity, tried before a common law jury.
In Strasburg v. State,' 2 the Supreme Court of Washington held that a
statute abolishing insanity as a defense to a charge of crime was unconstitutional, because it took away from the jury the question of criminal intent, thereby violating the "due process of law" and the "trial by
jury" clauses.
The third objection to the proposal is that it loses sight of the fact
that criminal responsibility is a legal question. The commission of
medical experts is competent to decide whether the defendant is sane or
insane, but in what respect it is fitted to determine whether the defendant
is guilty or not of murder or larceny, as the case may be?
The fourth objection arises from the legal requirement that criminal
responsibility depends upon the defendant's state of mind at the time
of the commission of the act, not at the time of the trial. If the commission would limit its inquiry to the present condition of the defendant, it would violate this requirement. If, on the other hand, it would
decide as to the defendant's condition at the time of the commission of
the act, it would be compelled to examine witnesses. As much of the
evidence to prove the act is material in determining the intent, the commission would have to re-examine many of the witnesses who testified
before the regular jury. In the trial before the regular jury the witnesses were governed by the legal rules of evidence; in the inquiry by
the commission they would not be, nor would the proceedings be under
the control of the judge. The examination of witnesses by the commission would be a complete usurpation of the functions of judge and jury.
Form of lTerdict.-According to the practice at common law and
in most of our states, the jury brings in a verdict of not guilty, when
they find that the defendant by reason of his insanity did not have
11143 Wis. 249 (1910).

iio Pac. Rep.

1020

(i910).
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the necessary criminal intent. Objection has been made to this general
verdict because it fails to include any finding as to insanity which may
be made the grounds for confinement in an asylum. By statute in
England in 1883, it was provided that:
(i) "Where in any indictment or information any act or omission is charged
against any person as an offense, and it is given in evidence on the trial of
such person for that offense, that he was insane so as not to be responsible
according to law for his actions, at the time when the act was done or omission made, then if it appears to the jury before whom such person is tried,
that he did the act or made the omission charged, but was insane as aforesaid at
the time when he did or made the same, the jury shall return a special verdict
to the effect that the accused was guilty of the act or omission charged against
him, but was insane as aforesaid at the time when he did the act or made the
omission.
(2)
"When such special verdict is found the court shall order the accused
to be kept in custody as a criminal lunatic, in such place and in such manner
as the Court shall direct till His Majesty's pleasure shall be known, and it
shall be lawful for His Majesty thereupon and from time to time, to give
such order for the safe' custody of the said person during pleasure, in such
place and in such manner as to His Majesty may seem fit.""

There is one fundamental objection to this statute, viz.: that it
makes insanity at the time of the commission of the act the ground for
'Trial of Lunatics Act, 1883 (46 and 47 Vict. C. 38) (b), s. 2 (1).
Since January, i9o9, the English statute has been in substance re-enacted
in this country as follows:
"After the passage of this act, if upon the trial of any male person accused
of a felony the defense of insanity, is interposed, whether upon a special plea
or a general plea of not guilty, the court or jury trying said cause shall make a
finding both as to the sanity of said defendant at the time so claimed and as to
whether he committed the act as charged. And if it shall be found in favor of
said defendant on such plea of insanity but against him as to the commission of
the act as charged, he shall upon order of the court be committed to and confined
in the Indiana colony for the insane criminals in like manner and on such conditions and for such terms as is now provided for by law for the confinement of
insane criminals in a state hospital for the insane." Laws of'Indiana, i9o9, c.
87, s. 163/2, p. 2o7.
"That any person prosecuted for an offense may plead that he is not guilty
by reason of insanity or mental derangement, and when the defense is insanity of
the defendant, the jury must be instructed, if they acquit him on that ground,
to state the fact in their verdict. The court must, thereupon, order the defendant
to be committed to the state hospital for the insane, until he becomes sane and
is discharged by due process of law. Provided that the defense of insanity may
be raised under the general plea of not guilty." Laws of Nebraska, io9, c. 74,
s. I,p. 333"If any person indicted for any crime shall be acquitted by reason of insanity or mental derangement and it shall appear to the satisfaction of the presiding
judge at said trial that it is dangerous to the safety of the community for such
person to be at large, he shall without further hearing commit such person to the
insane asylum." Laws of Hawaii, i9og, Act 149, S. 13, p. 194.
"If a person who is indicted for murder or manslaughter is acquitted by the
jury by reason of insanity, the court shall order him to be committed to a state
hospital for the insane during his natural life, and he may be discharged there-
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confinement after the trial. Suppose that the defendant has recovered
his sanity at the time of the verdict. On what ground can he be confined? Not because he has committed a crime, for the jury by their
verdict have negatived this; not for the purpose of treatment, because
by hypothesis he is not insane.
In January, 1911, a committee of the New York State Bar Association recommended for consideration the following:
"If, upon the trial of any person accused of any offense, it appears to the
jury upon the evidence that such person did the act charged, but was at the
time insane, so as not to be responsible for his actions, the jury shall return
a special verdict, 'guilty, but insane,' and thereupon the court shall sentence
such person to confinement in a state asylum for the criminal insane for such
term as he would have had to serve in prison, but for the finding of insanity;
and if upon the expiration of such term it shall appear to the court that such
person is still insane, his confinement in such asylum shall continue during
his insanity; and, further, when such a verdict of 'guilty, but insane,' is returned in a case where the penalty for the verdict of guilty against a sane
person is death, such sentence for the insane person thus found guilty shall be
for life; and in all such cases the governor shall have the power to pardon, after
such inquiry as he may see fit to institute upon the question whether it will
be safe for the public to allow such person to go at large."',

This proposal is much more objectionable than the English statute.
In the first place, the form of the proposed verdict is contradictory and
misleading. If the defendant was insane so as not to be responsible
for his actions, then he cannot "be guilty" according to the legal meaning of that word. Secondly, the proposal has the same fault as the
English statute, in that it makes insanity at the time of the act, refrom by the governor, with the advice and consent of the council, when he is
satisfied after an investigation by the state board of insanity that such person

may be discharged without danger to others."
c. 504, s. 104, p. 711.

Acts of Massachusetts, iog,

"Whenever, on the trial of any person upon an indictment, the accused shall
set up, in defense thereof his insanity, the jury, if they acquit such person upon
such ground, shall state that they have so acquitted him; and if the going at
large of the person so acquitted shall be deemed by the court dangerous to
the public peace, the court shall certify its opinion to that effect to the governor, who, upon the receipt of such certificate, may make provision for the
maintenance and support of the person so acquitted, and cause such person
to be removed to the prison insane ward, the state hospital for the insane, or
other institution for the insane during the continuance of such insanity." Acts
of Rhode Island, i9io (Aug. Sess.), c. 642, s. i, p. 1O4.
"If the defense is the insanity of the defendant, the jury must be instructed,
if they acquit him on that ground, to state the fact with their verdict. The court
may, thereupon, if the defendant is in custody, and it deems his discharge dangerous to the public peace or safety, order him to be committed to the care
and custody of the hospital for insane, until he becomes sane." Laws of South
Dakota,

9ii, c. 171, s. I, p. 211.

"New York State Bar Assn. Rep., vol. 34, P. 278 (1911).
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gardless of what may be the condition of defendant at the time of the
commission of the act, the ground for his confinement. Thirdly, the
proposal provides that one found "guilty, but insane" shall be sentenced
to a state asylum for a definite number of years. On what theory can
such a sentence be supported? The term "sentence" indicates that the
confinement is to be for the purpose of punishment, and this idea is
strengthened by the fact that the confinement is to be for a definite term.
The party, by the terms of the statute, is not criminally responsible, and
is consequently not a fit subject for punishment. The statute merely
substitutes an asylum for the penitentiary as a place of imprisonment.
It may be urged that the confinement in the asylum involves no idea
of punishment but is for the purpose of restraint and treatment merely.
Suppose the insane person recovers his sanity after a short period of confinement, then there is no need to restrain and treat him, yet by the
terms of the statute he is to be confined until his sentence has expired.
The proposed statute provides that the Governor may pardon in such a
case. How can he pardon one who is not criminally responsible and
hence is not a criminal? Finally, it might be urged that imprisonment
is not imposed for the purpose of punishment but merely for restraint
and that the character of the place of confinement merely depends upon
the kind of restraint and treatment demanded by the condition of the
individual. Though this theory is advanced by many, yet it is not
recognized by the law. Imprisonment for crime disenfranchises, disqualifies for public office, and is a ground for divorce in many states.
As was said by the court in State v. Strasburg, "We can not shut our
eyes to the fact that the element of punishment is still in our criminal
laws."
Statutory Abolition of the Defense of Ynsanity.-In 1910 the Committee of the New York State Bar Association submitted for discussion a proposal to abolish the defense of insanity." This suggestion was withdrawn in 1911,16 and the proposed statute, discussed
above, was substituted in its place. The legislature of the State of
Washington, in 1909, passed a law providing that insanity shall be no
"'"Insanity or other mental deficiency shall no loiger be a defense against a
charge of crime." New York State Bar Assn. Rep., vol. 33, P. 401 (gio).
"Referring to its proposal of igio the committee says in Ir9i: "Your committee had never in mind, to suggest even for discussion, such a change in our
criminal law as to shut out completely all evidence of insanity and thereby in
the event of a verdict of gailty, to put an insane man in the category of the convict condemned to death or jail." New York State Bar Assn. Rep., vol. 4,
P. 274 (1911).
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defense to a charge of crime.. 7 The committee of the bar associatioli
was influenced by the abuse of the defense of insanity and the difficulty
of trying the issue when insanity is involved and these -grounds induced
the legislature of Washington to abolish the defense. It is submitted
that such action is a confession of weakness. Because some sane men
escape punishment on a plea of insanity is no reason for punishing those
who are insane. Because the machinery- of the law is ineffective is no
reason for repealing fundamental legal principles. The Washington
statute was held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the State in
State v. Strasburg, already cited. This decision has been criticized
in some quarters on the ground that the Legislature has the right to do
away with criminal intent as a requisite of criminality. Whether this
legal criticism be endorsed, or not, we believe that it will be generally
agreed that the abolition of the defense of insanity is not the proper
way to remedy its abuse.
Proposed Legislation.-At this point the following propositions will
be taken as established: (1) That one who, by reason of his insanity,
did not have the necessary criminal intent at the time of the commission of a wrong within the province of the criminal law, should not be
convicted or punished; (2) that one, who by reason of his insanity is
a menace to the safety or health of the public, should be confined for
purposes of restraint and treatment, such confinement to end whenever,
if at aZl, he regains his normal mental condition, and not before.
The problem is to accomplish the proper result in each case, and
this problem is made more difficult by the fact that one who was insane
at the time of the commission of the wrong, may be sane at the time
of the trial. For the solution of this problem, your Committee recommends the enactment of the following statute:
(i) Where in any indictment or information any act or omission is charged
against any person as an offense, and it is given in evidence on the trial of
such person for that offense that he was insane so as not to be responsible
according to law for his actions, at the time when the act was done or omission made, then if it appears to the jury before whom such person is tried,
that he did the act or made the omission charged, but by reason of his insanity
was not responsible according to law, the jury shall return a special verdict that
the accused committed the act or made the omission charged against him, but
was not responsible according to law, by reason of his insanity, at the time when
he did the act or made the omission.

"'"It shall be no defense to a person charged with the commission of a
crime, that at the time of its commission, he was unable by reason of his insanity, idiocy or embecility to comprehend the nature and quality of the act committed, or to understand that it was wrong; or that he was afflicted with a
morbid propensity to commit prohibited acts; nor shall any testimony or other
proof thereof be admitted in evidence." Laws of Washington, i9o9, c. 249, s. 7.
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(2) When such special verdict is found, the court shall remand the prisoner
to the custody of the proper officer and shall immediately order an inquisition
by the proper persons to determine whether the prisoner is now insane so as to
be a menace to the public health or safety. If the persons who conduct the
inquisition so find, then the judge shall order that such insane person be committed to the state hospital for the insane, to be confined there until in the
opinion of the proper authorities he has recovered his sanity and may be
safely dismissed from the said hospital. If the members of the inquisition find
that the prisoner is not insane as aforesaid, then he shall be discharged from
custody.
(3) That when an insane person shall have been committed to the
state hospital for the insane in accordance with the provisions of the preceding
section, no judge of competent jurisdiction shall issue a writ of habeas corpus
for the release of such person on the grounds that he is no longer insane, unless
the petitioner for such writ presents sufficient evidence to establish a prima
facie case of sanity on the part of the person confined as aforesaid. Or,
(3) That when an insane person shall have been committed to the state
hospital for the insane in accordance with the provisions of the preceding
section and a writ of habeas corpus has issued for the release of such person,
upon the hearing of which writ such person has not been released from confinement, then no judge of competent jurisdiction shall issue a writ of habeas
corpus for the release of such person on the ground that he is no longer insane, unless the petitioner for such writ presents to the judge as aforesaid evidence sufficient to show that the mental condition of the person confined has
improved since the hearing upon the first writ, so as to render it probable
that he is sufficiently sane to justify his release from the asylum.

The first section of the proposed statute is based upon the English
statute. The form of the special verdict has been changed, however, so
as to avoid the use of the contradictory terms "guilty" and "insane."
The special verdict here proposed indicates the correct relation which
insanity bears to criminal responsibility.
The second section recognizes that one who by reason of insanity
is not responsible according to law for the wrong he has done, should
not be punished because he has committed such wrong. The section is designed to secure his commitment to a hospital in case his
condition warrants confinement., The commitment of the party to
custody pending the inquisition is not illegal or unconstitutional. This
was squarely decided by a Circuit Court of the United States in Brown
8
v. Urquhart.'
The third section is designed to prevent the improper release from
confinement of one who has been committed to a public hospital under
the provision of section 2. It is claimed that under the present practice
a person may escape punishment for a wrong done on the ground that
he was insane, and then by suing out an indefinite number of writs of
is139 Fed. Rep. 846.
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habeas corpus, finally find a tender-hearted judge, who will release him
on the ground that he is sane.19 The provision of the third section will
remedy this evil. 20 The question remains, however, as to whether the
section is constitutional. At first sight it may appear that it amounts
to a suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. A review of the cases
21
will show that such conclusion is unwarranted. In Hobhouse's case it
was held by the King's Bench Division that a judge may refuse to issue
a writ of habeas corpus unless probable ground is shown that the party
confined is entitled to be released. The coifrt quotes with approval the
statement made by Lord C. J. Wilmot, in 1758, in the Rouse of Lords:
"He there states it to be his opinion that those writs ought not to issue
of course; adding that a writ which issues on a probable cause, verified by
affidavit, is as much a writ of right as a writ which issues of course."

In Sim's case, 22 Shaw C. J., said:
"This is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, to bring the petitioner before
this court, with a view to his discharge from imprisonment, upon the grounds
stated in the petition. We were strongly urged to issue the writ, without inquiry into its cause, and to hear an argument upon the petitioner's right to
a discharge on the return of the writ. This we declined to .do on grounds of
principle and common and well-settled practice. Before a writ of habeas
corpus is granted, sufficient probable cause must be shown. * * * It is not
granted as a matter of course. * * * The same court must decide whether
the imprisonment complained of is illegal; and whether the inquiry is had, in the
first instance, on the application, or subsequently, on the return of the writ,
or partly on the one and partly on the other, it must depend on the same facts
and principles, and be governed by the same rule of law."

In Ex parte Yarborough2 1 upon a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus, the Supreme Court of the United States, following the custom
existing in early English cases, issued a rule to the marshal to show
cause why the writ of habeas corpus should not issue. The return
showing imprisonment under formal sentence, the court said it would
"in an address before the New York State Bar Association in 19o9 Dr.
Robert R. Lamb, medical superintendent of the Matteawan State Hospital, stated
that during the year i9o8 there were forty-one writs of habeas corpus issued
for the release of patients from the Matteawan Hospital, on the hearing of which
writs thirty-four of the petitioners were discharged, and that fourteen of these
later found their way back either to hospital or prison.
'"In an article published in the Journal of the American Medical Association
(Feb. 18, 1911, vol. XXI, p. 481) Frederick A. Fenning of the Washington (D. C.)
bar urged that the petitioner for a suit of habeas corpus should establish a
prima facie case of sanity. Mr. Fenning also advocated "a uniformity of practice
which will result in -lbeas corpus cases being held before the nearest judge of
competent jurisdiction without the questionable aid of a jury."

3 B. and AId. 12o.
7Cush. 285, 291.
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consider the right of the prisoner to be released on the writ to show
cause. In Simmons v. Georgia Iron & Coal Co.,2 the Supreme Court
of Georgia, by Cobb, J., says:
"But while the writ of habeas corpus is a "writ of right" it did not,
either under the common law or the Statute of harles II., issue as a matter of
course, but only on probable cause shown. It was, under the English practice,
incumbent upon the party moving for the writ to make a prima fade showing
under oath authorizing the' discharge of the party restrained of his liberty."

Exactly what shall constitute reasonable ground for the release
of a person confined under section 2, so as to justify the issuance of a
writ under section '3, remains to be settled. It has been suggested
that the judge should require the affidavits of two competent physicians
that the person confined has recovered his sanity. 2' This requirement
would be prohibitive for one who did not have the funds to employ
such physicians. Perhaps it is sufficiently definite to require that a
prima facie case of sanity must be shown before the writ will issue.
At any rate, it is suggested that such requirement will suffice for a
consideration of the general provisions of the section.
Summary of the Recommendations.-Your Committee makes the
following recommendations:
(1) That the legal tests of insanity for determining criminal responsibility be abolished.
(2) That insanity should be held to be a good defense, whenever
it negatives the necessary criminal intent.
(3) That the various medical associations shall establish and maintain a code of professional ethics to govern medical experts.
(4) That the various bar associations shall establish and maintain
a code of professional ethics to govern counsel in criminal trials, where
the defense of insanity is raised.
(5) That medical witnesses who give opinion evidence in criminal
cases, where the defense is insanity, shall be chosen from 'a qualified
group.
(6) That the respective functions of medical expert, judge and
jury shall be as set forth in this report.
fA117 Ga. 3o5, 3ii (19a3).

'Report of Committee on Commitment and Discharge of the Criminal
Insane, New York Bar Assn. Rep., vol. 34, P. 391, 394.
"Where there exists difference of opinion between the lunatic and his friends
and the hospital management, it would seem perfectly fair that the same proceed-.
ing necessary to make the lunatic were employed to restore him to competency.
That is, the certificate of two competent medical examiners, and the approval
of the juage of a court of record." From paper by Dr. Robert R. Lamb, in New
York State Bar Assn. Rep., vol. 32, P. 6o, 67 (19o9).
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(7) That the statute proposed by the committee be enacted into
law by the legislatures of the various states.
The foregoing recommendations are put forward as tentative only,
and it is hoped that they will be freely discussed and criticized.
A.
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Dr. MoRToN PRINCE, of Boston (professor of neurology in Tufts Medical
College): As I see the matter, the general dissatisfaction that exists and has
long existed with the trials, as ordinarily conducted, of those accused of
crime when insanity has been set up as a defense, and with the verdict of the
jury in many cases, has resulted in a large degree from two conditions:
First, the legal test of responsibility which, with modifications in some
jurisdictions, is laid down to the jury, and in accordance with which medical
experts are examined, is not one which, in many cases, can be practically applied
without giving rise to just criticism.
Speaking as a medical man, I am heartily in accord with the conclusion of
the committee that the legal tests of insanity be abolished or rather, as I would
prefer to phrase it, the legal tests of responsibility. At least, I concur with the
recommendation of the committee to this extent, that that legal test which pre538
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vails in most jurisdictions should be abolished. In this I think I voice the
sentiment of the profession to which I belong.
The famous answers of the judges of England in 1843 to the questions
of the House of Lords as to criminal, responsibility in a certain class of insane
persons have been applied, excepting in a few localities, to all accused insane
persons as a test of responsibility, from that time to the present day, though to
use the words of the report "with modifications in some jurisdictions." According to this test, as everybody knows, for an insane person not to be legally
i esponsible, it must be shown that he "was laboring under such a defect of
reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of
the act he was doing, or if he knew it, that he did not know that what he was
doing was wrong."
I say "the questions of the House of Lords as to criminal responsibility in
a certain class of insane persons" advisedly, for it is a curious and interesting
fact that the questions did not refer to all types of insane persons but only to a
special type, and the answers of the judges did not refer to all types of insanity
but only to this special type about which the questions were asked, and yet the
answer I have just quoted has been applied ever since as a test in all kinds of
insanity. Objections to the test have been made on this ground. It has been
objected that the test was a restricted answer to a restricted question and did
not refer, and we must assume was not intended by the judges to refer, to
all cases of insanity. The questions of the Lords and the answers of the
judges referred only to persons laboring under partial delusion only (i.C.,
deltsion in respect to one or more particular subjects or persons) who are
otherwise sane. But the answers have been applied as a test to insane persons
in general-to those without delusions as well as those with delusions, to persons with general delusions as well as partial delusions, to persons wholly
insane as well as those who, according to the theories of that day, are otherwise
not insane, i. e., aside from a particular delusion.
I take it, however, the lawyers will say that the answers of the judges were
not new-made law but only a restatement or formulation of the law as it was
to be found in previous decisions, and if the questions had been asked in
reference to all kinds of insane people, the answers would have been the same
and the same formula proposed. That was the law of the time.
The inadequacy of this formula or test will be seen when it is remarked
that it is based upon a conception of insanity that is a myth-a condition of mind
that never exists. The law assumes that a person may be laboring under a delusion and not be otherwise insane. The truth probably is as Dr. Mercier, a
distinguished psychiatrist and psychologist, says: "There is not, and never has
been, a person who labors under partialdeltsion only and is not in other respects
insane. Here is where the judges fell into a trap of sophistry owing to the
then incomplete knowledge of mental disease and the ways in which the various
faculties of the mind are affected. I take it that all medical men will be unanimous in the view that delusions are the effect and expression of a general
mental derangement and not the derangement itself, and, therefore, that the mind
must be otherwise deranged than as shown by a particular delusion. If a
person is not otherwise insane, he will not have a delusion. This makes the
difference between an insane delusion and that kind of false opinion in sane
people which under another use of the term is called a delusion. An insane
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delusion being a false belief, the falsity of which cannot be corrected by such an
examination and comparison with the facts as would suffice in healthy people,
if a person laboring under a delusion cannot correct 'it by examination and
comparison, it is evidence that his reasoning 'processes, at least, are deranged."
The law, then, is based upon an erroneous conception of insanity, and of
the capabilities of an insane person, whether he has delusions or not, to control his reasoning processes.'
I pass over the point which has been often raised and which has been emphasized in the report of the committee as to the difference in the lay and medical
conceptions of insanity. To the medical man, insanity is a general term,
merely a convenient -and arbitrary expression to define certain kinds and degrees of mental derangement. 9cientifically speaking, there never has been,
and there never can be, a definition of insanity. There are forms of mental
derangement in which there is entire moral and legal irresponsibility but which.
arbitrarily in medical lore are not classified as insanity, and which, scientifically
classified, are not sanity. The fact is, we have agreed, as a matter of convenience,
to classify certain types of mental derangement as insanity, neglecting many
others which exhibit an equally high degree of mental derangement. On the other
hand, amongst the insanities are to be found derangments of slight degree and
importance. A legal test of insanity is, therefore, impossible; there is not,
and there cannot be, a legal test of insanity.
It is no wonder then that the .test has failed in practice to convince
juries and the public and has given rise to criticism of trials based upon it.
As a matter of fact, if the jury in the very case which gave rise to the questions
of the Lords-the McNaughton case-had been governed by it, a verdict of
guilty would have been necessitated. It is now commonly accepted, I believe, by
all writers that McNaughton was properly acquitted as irresponsible by reason
of his acknowledged insanity. Certainly no medical man of the present day
would hold, I am sure, that McNaughton, governed by a delusion as he was, ought
to have been adjudged responsible. And yet he certainly must have known, when
he shot and killed Mr. Drummond, the nature and quality of his act and that
what he did was wrong. The test, therefore, does not touch the very case
which gave rise to the formula. It does not'touch, again, for example, the cAse
of Hadfield, who thought he was our Lord and fired at George III hoping to
be hung that the world might be saved. Iadfield was properly acquitted by
action of the judge who stopped the trial, and yet, according to the.test, he
should have been found guilty. And so with numerous other cases that might
be cited. The only way out of it is to make the test exhaustive by interpreting
the words in a broad sense, so broad that, as Dr. Iercier points out, the King's
English becomes so stretched and perverted that one'wonders whether hitherto
he has had a real acquaintance with his native tongue.
Uiidoubtedly in this spirit, the law has been at times so broadly interpreted,
so wide and generous a meaning has been given t6 the word "know," that it
has been made to cover nearly every possible condition of mental derangement
and to prescribe a just limitation of responsibility. , But this has not always
been the case. Many judges, as in the Thaw case, -have taken the test in its
narrow and literal meaning, and then it has become shockingly inadequate. Thus'
another cause for dissatisfaction with the test is lack of uniformity ii"'its"
interpretation. The fact, I believe, is that in many cases when this 'test is
540
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applied in its literal and true meaning the juries disregard it, for its effect
would be such that the moral sense of the community would be shocked because
of the monstrous consequences. But we must recognize the fact that so far as the
test laid down by the English judges in 1843 narrowly interpreted is still law,
it represents antiquated knowledge. ',It may have been based upon what once
was scientific knowledge, but it is so no longer. Judicial opinion, i. e., judicial
law, but has lagged behind the progress of medical sciences and I think it may be
justly said that judicial law in this respect must almost necessarily be less influenced by scientific opinion than statute law, "for statute law is the expression
of the point of view and wishes of the community. If it does not represent public opinion in the matter which it governs, it can be amended or repealed, a
process which is constantly taking place to make laws conform to the progress
of thought and the changes in public sentiment. This sentiment itself is very
largely molded by the diffusion through the community of information on any
given subject by those who have special knowledge of it. So that in the case
of mental responsibility, for example, the special knowledge of those who are
learned in the diseases of the mind can make itself felt in shaping legislation
which shall determine responsibility before the law. It is quite different with
common law, which is the formulation of the opinions of a very learned body
of men, but learned in a special branch of human knowledge-the law, a large
part of which is made up of those opinions. Public opinion and sentiment to
a very slight extent and only indirectly can shape, amend or formulate such laws;
they rest entirely on the attitude of mind, the wisdom and special knowledge of
judicial minds; nor can the knowledge of those learned in other branches of
research, excepting indirectly, guide in their evolution. Fundamentally, every
opinion rests on knowledge, and when any given opinion, such as that of what
ought to constitute mental responsibility, rests on knowledge of a special branch
of human inquiry, mental disease, its wisdom is directly proportionate to the
knowledge which he who expresses it has of that special branch of learning."
I believe, therefore, that if we are to have a test of responsibility, it must
be one which is in uniformity with scientific knowledge and must be altered from
time to time in conformity with the progress of scientific knowledge. I doubt
myself whether any concise formula can be devised which will be intelligible to a
jury and which is not capable of individual interpretation according to personal
bias, whether of judge or juryman.
The committee has recommended that the legal tests of insanity (or responsibility) be abolished. If by this is meant, as I assume to be the case, the
so-called "right and wrong" test, I am heartily in accord with the recommendation, and I believe that in this I voice the opinion of the medical profession.
I would point out, however, that the interpretation of the law as expounded by
Chief Justice Shaw in 1844, and which I understand is still the law in Massachusetts, would seem to answer all the requirements of scientific knowledge
and to be just to the accused and society. If this lengthy exposition could be
universally used in the sense of a test, it would seem to answer all the requirements of the problem.
As to the second recommendation of the committee, "That insanity should
be held to be a good defense whenever it negatives the necessary criminal intent,"
not being a lawyer I do not feel that I am qualified to express an opinion on
so technical a matter. To do so would require that one should have a thorough
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understanding of the meaning of "criminal inten"' as known to the law. To
me, as a layman, however, it would seem that this recommendation is substantially in agreement with the law as laid down by Chief Justice Shaw to which
I have just referred. "In order," it is there stated, "to commit a crime, a
person must have intelligence and capacity enough to have a criminal intent
and purpose; and if his reason and mental powers are either so deficient that
lie has lno will, no conscience or controlling mental power, or if, through the
overwhelming violence of mental disease, his intellectual power is for the time
obliterated, he is not a responsible moral agent, and is not- punishable for
criminal acts."
However, on this recommendation, I do not feel qualified to hold an
opinion for reasons I have stated.
The second of the two reasons for dissatisfaction, to which I referred at
the beginning of my remarks, is the existing procedure in this country under
which expert testimony is given. The committee in its report has pointed out
other reasons with which I fully concur, but I shall confine myself to these
two alone.
Under the present system of employing experts, of examining into the
mental condition of the accused, and of taking expert testimony, I do not believe
that any witness, however qualified, can give satisfactory opinions. He certainly
cannot form an opinion and testify thereto in a way satisfactory to himself. In
its report, the committee recommends that experts "shall be chosen from a
qualified group." This recommendation I heartily endorse. The criticism that
I would make is that it does not go quite far enough. The general latitude
in allowing in practice, whatever be the theory, a physician with slight experience with mental disease-indeed almost any physician with little knowledge and less experience in psychiatry-to testify as an expert is an absurdity.
It may be said it is open to the jury to determine how, much weight shall be
given to an expert's opinion according to his experience and other qualifications.
But it is an equal absurdity to expect a layman to be able to judge of the
qualifications of experts. He is much more likely, as in the case of selecting
eneral practitioners in every-day life, to be influenced by this assurance,
mannerisms and I may say "bluff" of the witness. It is very desirable,
therefore, that the expert should be chosen from a qualified group, as recommended by the committee.
But this, in my opinion, does not go far enough. Under the present
system of employing experts, of making the examination of the accused, and
of giving testimony, it is almost impossible for any expert, however qualified, judicially minded and unbiased he may be, to give satisfactory evidence.
As it is now-and it would be the same under the proposed plan-he is
employed on each side according to his known views on theoretical subjects.
Indeed, some men are known as biased experts for the defense and some for the
plaintiff, The examinations of the accused are then made by each group
separately apart from the other. Each side keeps its knowledge and point of
view secret to itself. g.o consultations or discussions between the experts of
the two sides are allowed. Imagine the members of a court arriving at
unanimity of opinion, or even sound judicial opinion, or the members of a
jury arriving at a sound judgment under similar circumstances. Then the
experts on each side are lined up in battle array, subjected to examination
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and cross-examination calculated to bring out only the points favorable to
each side respectively, and often, as I know from personal experience, leaving untouched crucial points which one side is afraid of and the other
"darsent" touch for fear of an unfavorable answer. Deftly worded questions
by clever counsel elicit answers meant by the witness to cover one class of
facts but by specious reasoning and connotation of language made by counsel skilled in dialectics to apply to another class of facts.
Under such methods the most qualified, the most unbiased and judicialminded expert becomes a partisan for the side that employs him. Happy that
expert who leaves the stand satisfied with himself and that he has presented
the truth as he knows it.
The only complete remedy for this state of affairs I believe to be
the German system; but this I am told would be unconstitutional in this country.
If it were constitutional, experts should be appointed by the court, employed
by the court, and paid-by the court. They should be responsible only to the
court. But as this systems seems to be impossible on constitutional grounds,
certain, principles of procedure pertaining to it might be adopted. In the
first place, experts should be selected by both sides only from a qualified
group as the committee recommends. Second, they should be paid by the
court.* Third, examinations by experts of each side should be made jointly
so far as possible and opinions on questions at issue, after consultation and
full discussion, should be made in writing to the court. Such opinions should
state the points on which there is full agreement on each side, and those, on
which there is disagreement. When the hypothetical question is put, it should
be in writing, and the answer given in writing after time for due consideration
and weighing of the facts. This last I believe a very important procedure.
Further, I would say that when the defense of existing insanity is set up,
the Maine system, which has been adopted in New Hampshire, Vermont and
Massachusetts, should be resorted to. The accused person is committed to
an asylum to remain in the control of the court until it is determined by
continuous observation under unbiased and qualified experts, whether or
not he is insane. I do not believe the layman appreciates the difficulty oi
determining the mental coridition in doubtful cases- unless opportunity for
continuous observation, day and night, is permitted.
Finally, I will say that in my judgment so long as it is unconstitutional
to have experts appointed by the court, I do not believe that we shall ever
reach a perfectly satisfactory method of obtaining expert testimony. But
much can be done to improve the present system, and the recommendations of
the committee go a long way in this direction.
As to the other recommendations of the committee, Nos. 3, 4, 6, and 7,
I forbear discussing them, as I have already taken more than my fair share
of the time. I will only add that they seem to be highly commendable.
Dr. P. C. KNAPP, of Boston (instructor in diseases of the nervous system, Harvard Medical School) : Mr. President: I fully agree with the report
which has been presented by this committee, especially in the abolition of the
so-called legal definition of insanity, which is more than medieval, it is absolutely antediluvian. I cannot go quite so far as Dr. Prince has done. Since
we have served on a committee together, I have had occasion to go over the
decision of Chief Justice Shaw again, and it seems to me it must be modi-
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flied considerably, and, in fact, has been modified in our courts, in order to fit
the requirements of modern ideas of insanity. The expert question is an exceedingly difficult one. The recommendations recently made by the American
Neurological Association might serve, that the expert should be connected with
various societies and have had a certain number of years' experience. The
danger of that is, if it should be recognized by the law, I fear medical societies
would spring into existence which would have as much relation to true
clinics as a Raines-Law sandwich does to a square meal. But the expert
at present, under the present methods of legal procedure, never has a fair
chance. He is sworn to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the
truth, and if he attempts it, the lawyers on both sides, and sometimes the
judge, immediately shut him off. If an expert could hear all the testimony
on both sides and then give his opinion, it might be worth while. I regret
that the committee has taken the attitude which it has in regard to the
appointment of commissions. They have certainly worked well here in Massachusetts. They may not be legal, but they have prevented a good many
murder trials, and the accused has been adjudged insane and sent to an
asylum and the commonwealth has been saved the expense of a trial. There
have not been in Massachusetts, in my recollection, any of the scandals
which have existed in New York. In the capital cases the expert testimony,
in my experience, has been fairly presented on the two sides (even when
the commission has not been appointed) and in many instances the appointment of a commission has solved the question of insanity.
Mr. KEEDY (chairman of the committee) : Regarding what Dr. Knapp said
as to the Massachusetts 'commission, when the defense of insanity is set up,
the man is committed to an asylum by the court, for a certain time, during
which his case is investigated by the physicians, and they determine whether
he is sane or insane; if insane, there is no trial; if sane, he is referred Lack
to the court. Now the difficulty with that is, that the commission is limited
to determining the defendant's present mental condition and cannot inquire
into his condition at the time of the doing of the act. Is that right?
Dr. KNAPP: No. I think every commission, so far as I am informed,
has considered the question of a man's sanity at the time the act was committed.
Roscoa POUND, of Cambridge (professor of law in Harvard University):
Two things in the discussion struck me particularly. One thing I have seen in
meetings of other associations-I mean a disclaimer of local short-comings.
T remember, at one time I was a guest of a gentleman in the south, and we
took a horseback ride through the mountains, and I had heard a great deal
about moonshine and I asked some very indiscreet questions and the people
always said to me, "Well there ised to be some;, but there hasn't been any
around here for a number of years, but there is right smart of it in the
adjoining county." Now, I notice that in people when they discuss legal
procedure. And the medical gentlemen from Massachusetts, in their opinion
on Judge Shaw's decision, seem to think that this state hasn't anything open
to criticism, but "there is right smart of it in the state of New York." The
truth of it is, in the Rogers case, that Judge Shaw did nothing exsept what
was done in the M'Naghten case. He had an advantage that judges do not
have in some states; he could give an oral charge and explain to the jury
the way in which they might apply those rules. But, we want to remember that
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M'Naghten's case only represents one of the four views to be found in the
decisions of this country. Some of the states, and notably New York, have
adhered to the M'Naghten case in its original form. I think it was Judge
Cooley in Michigan who went on entirely different view, that insanity had to do
with the will element rather than the state of consciousness. Then, in two states
at least, in New Hampshire and Alabama, we have very illuminating opinion by
Chief Justice Doe and Justice Somerville. Judge Doe's is the one usually
cited, so that Judge Doe and Judge Somerville have given us a proposition
substantially, I take it, such as the committee contend for, that insanity
is not a legal question; the legal question is responsibility; the question of
-insanity is a medical question.
I want to mention briefly another matter. Our medical friends complain
a great deal about the way they are treated in court, and with some justification probably; but I think they labor under a slight misapprehension.
Most of them with whom I have conferred seem to feel it is really their duty
to decide whether this accused person is or is not to be convicted, and I take
it the lawyer can never concede that point. I take it that the question
whether this person is to be held liable is a question that belongs to the law.
Having determined what the legal rule is, we can turn to our friends of the
medical profession to tell us, as near as they can, what the facts are as to this
person's condition, ind then we must apply the legal rule. In that matter
I should feel that the report of the committee is doing us a real service.
Mr. ATcRINs, of Tennessee: As a practitioner who has tried insanity
cases from the state side, I wish to urge the necessity of an insanity plea.
,It puts the state at a great disadvantage to know the kind of insanity that is
going to be plead. I think there ought to be a preliminary plea of insanity.
W. 0. HART, of Louisiana: I am impressed with the remarks of the
gentleman from Tennessee, because we have the same difficulty in my state.
The defense of insanity may come in at the last moment, and we do not know
what it is until it is presented, with the experts to back it up.
Mr. IEFEDY: I would like to say, in answer to the question of the last
two gentlemen, that the committee intends to report on the question of the
plea of insanity. The work as outlined will cover about five years.

